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Of course, we entertain views otherwise: That's our nature.

(The) Street Controls (You) is a pithy, enlightening atomization of the technology, power and money that animate the great capital markets beast, ensuring your docile, obedient servitude.

Deconstructed, checked for ticks, and explained, we'll show you how its hairy hands are at every moment clasped around and working the levers of our world.

Friday, July 27, 2012

A Primer For Wall Street Residents and Occupiers Alike



First, there is no grand conspiracy: The most money begets the most power. The Street's got a ton of money. And hence, power. And they use it: They use vast amounts of big money to make policy. Don't kid yourself: No politician of the modern ilk ever did anything he wasn't pressured into. They are led to water by whoever's applying the most pressure to the elected mule, which is almost nearly always industry. And this industry controls the capital flows of the majority of money that has real power, meaning enough weight to truly move markets, including the shit-eating scrum of our country's politics - that Hades of small-minded rage and bitterness that disservices us continually. But money parts the smile on the jackass, no matter who wields the cart up the steps into the stalls of government.

And financial services, aside from the medical sector (Big Pharma and the like), has consistently been the biggest spending lobby group in America, which is still the largest economy in the world. Open Secrets shows financial services outspending everybody from 1998 through 2005, outpaced since only by Big Pharma, and then occasionally by a bunch of industries oddly lumped into one sector called "Misc. Business." And when it comes to overall spending in this election cycle, The Street can't be beat. It obliterates the competition, as it often does. And don't bring up organized labor. Corporations of all types consistently outspend labor by a country mile: When you're told otherwise you're being made to eat what's inedible. Unions have been marginalized for decades, helped in no small part by both the global race to the bottom of the cheap labor barrel, and also by domestic labor's own recalcitrance. The expendable income of, and what gets spent from, corporate treasuries dwarfs that of what unions can ever muster.

But let's just all get over ourselves and get it straight: The Street's real power is used to write the rulebook that enables The Street to easier get what The Street wants: More money. Fewer problems. Contrary to Biggie Smalls' lyrics but presumed probably, by most of our experiences. The Street nearly always wins because they paid a lot for victory. So: Winning. Mostly. Always. Let's not even quibble: The first draft of nearly every draft of legislation gets written by corporate lawyers from whichever industry hobbyhorse said legislator rode into office on, or needs to remain. Policy is made by those paying for the sausage to get made their way. And this industry, like others, pays for their own, very specifically congealed playbook.

Above are facts. There is no judgment therein. The aforementioned truths are of such a basic, obvious nature, all reasonable persons can easily agree on them, including Wall Street residents, and occupiers, alike. (Please beware of anyone telling you otherwise, because they're condescending to you, and working you, on a need-to-know, Straussian, smile-as-I-demean-you, basis.)

So now that we know the parameters of the field on which we play, what exactly are we playing, and what for?

Let's set out some consensus observations: The Street is occupied, and nervous. So are we all: We don't like what we've become. And I mean "we," as in all of us, Americans, Wall Street residents and occupiers, alike. We don't like this place, this field, this plaza, this square on which we've alighted, full of said "residents" and "occupiers," shouting at one another. But we've been pushed here. Which begs the question: Pushed, by whom? Pushed, by what?

Money.

Specifically, the opportunity, or lack thereof, to make it, and use it to influence.

The occupiers are beating drums to call on the Masters of the Universe for some answers. Quite a few occupiers say they're indebted to a game they feel they've no control over which seems rigged against them. Many say they don't see as much opportunity in what's been marketed as a land of opportunity versus past generations; nor able to work said game on terms they can, want or should be expected to cope with. They question the fairness of said game as it's played, and the ethics - some would more pointedly call conflicts - of those who most control it. Many wonder aloud why they seem to have less opportunity than was accorded the Masters of the Universe themselves, when said Masters were first rising to mere Solar System Capos.

And most of the residents, well, they hate drum circles. Nobody likes drum circles. Nor being singled out. But not all occupiers are drum majors, and not all residents are bankers. And not all bankers are bad, just as not all occupiers are shiftless. There are many, many good, very smart people who work diligently and hard at what they do and add value that extends beyond themselves who do very little to zero harm within and without the system in which they work. But the system as it stands, The Street, has most assuredly failed itself and us. And if you weren't part of the home-hawking machine and didn't overextend yourself and didn't buy a house you couldn't afford during the years that amounted to economic Zenga you were an innocent bystander who nonetheless has suffered the opportunity-zapping and wealth-sapping aftereffects of a cataclysm caused by those who did do those things. And who controls the system?

But even Wall Street, the system can, and has, been a force for good. The Street has done capital-raising that matters in a wider sense, in that it has bestowed value beyond self-dealing or enriching only or mostly itself. Some would say too rarely. But it has taken risks which have resulted in few if any victims. But again, some would say too rarely. What appears to predominate is the opposite: The Street seems to be continually shown to work too often at what appears a zero-sum game, in which it takes none of the risks for making most of the bundles when the risks can be shifted onto someone data-deprived or less informed, while disclaiming any responsibility for the aftereffects or consequences of the actions regardless of facts and circumstances. This, even though, it doesn't have to be this way. Business done ethically and fairly is business done well, makes one money and proud to be in said business. That there hasn't been a crisis of conscious on Wall Street is appalling, because it shows an appalling lack of self-reflection among so many in this industry, and hence, very little leadership to be admired, beyond kudos for surviving as the toothiest shark in the tank. While sad, that should perhaps surprise no one: As that's the game, as sharks opt to play it. But if being nice means you've retired, then what does being ethical mean?

And look: No one will ever laud anyone else who takes advantage of another's lack of knowledge of what they're being sold. True, it's a tough world out there. Caveat emptor: buyer beware, or fool get taken. But whenever you sell something to someone without the same full good faith and disclosure that you would require for yourself, don't expect to be liked, ever, in return. For hoodwinking a fool. Again, who after all, has the preponderance of responsibility with the knowledge available? How conflicted, responsible, self-reflective or unmoved in answering this question one feels, we guess, depends on how due north one's moral or ethical compass tends to point.

Fact is, there were causal actors - real people - involved in the crash, who worked to create the wreckage we've been left to deal with. Homebuyers who purchased a home they truly couldn't afford, and The Street: These were the two main causal actors. No one disagrees with that. But again, in what essentially is an equation of dealer and junkie, lies an ethical question: Which, the junkie or the dealer, possesses the information and presence of mind that would foist some sense of moral responsibility or ethics into these transactions? Who was/is best equipped to take advantage of the other? With whom, if there is an imbalance of power, does the advantage and disadvantage lie, in such a relationship? The junkie or the dealer? The consumer or the bank? Which led us here? And who made the policy that shaped the system with which the vast jobs and wealth in the last years was able to so easily and quickly be destroyed and remain gone? Occupiers, residents?

Essentially, what are we - meaning, all of us, Americans - saying, or doing, amid all this?

It seems obvious that: We're having a conversation about America. But what is it? What should it be? How do we get there?

Before we tackle that, let's quickly break the house of sticks that obnoxiously plots this conversation as a struggle of capitalism versus socialism. No one who isn't a shit-slinging shill knows that's not what this conversation is about, at all. No reasonable, honest person wants the country to become socialist, because all reasonable, honest people know a completely socialist economy begets patronage, apathy, inequality, resentment and political monarchy, just as one with huge income disparities does. And just as no reasonable, honest person wants the country to become completely, fundamentally market-run, because hell, the banks can't even handle the full rigors of capitalism and the market: For shit's sake, we, the people, the taxpayers, are the banks' biggest financial backstops aside the Fed. That's been proven. The banks don't expose themselves to the disciplines of the market. It's too tough out there, after all.

And despite the toxic, sewer-belching lies of the roving gang of political hack asshats working out their psycho-pathologies of middle school disenchantment as adults: No doctor with a scintilla of morality waits to receive money before working to save a human patient that's dying in front of said MD. And while the bill may surely be in the mail, that kind of market fundamentalism would rile a portion of the crowd around this fictional doc to pummel his cash-upfront, Ayn Rand-t-shirt wearing self to the point where he needed a doctor; a good, real one, who would first work on the dying patient with no incentive but his own morality.

Let's additionally dispense with the "fault" question; meaning, who was at fault for our current economic predicament, as that's really up to this:

Who do you have more empathy for: The junkie (the delusional homebuyer), or the dealer (The Street). As we've determined, policy goes to the highest bidder. And gaggles of individuals acting separately with disparate goals and no money, lose nearly every time to organizations with highly disciplined purpose and fat lucre.

What we can most definitely all agree upon about our recent economic past is that too much of what was being sold was shit. Shit that a good deal of us didn't ask for by the way.

Speaking of, know this, all you blame-deflectors out there who publicly display nary an ounce of self-reflection: There are a lot among us Americans who didn't buy any homes or sell any real estate and who also weren't mortgage bankers or regulators during the time when those counter-parties created the volume-versus-sanity froth that caused the whole global economy to crater into the shithole under the outhouse where we now all slosh. So those folks who didn't buy overpriced real estate nor were bankers the last eight or so years: We didn't contribute one iota, not at all - not one bit - to what caused the meltdown. Yet we suffer just as bad as everyone else for its jobless, growth-less aftereffects. There's the voting block to court and respect.

A quick word about regulators: The Street paid for the system it got. Regulators are nearly always feckless foot-servants when the system rewards them for being so. Regulators nearly never act timely or often enough appropriately because they're afraid to, and essentially, paid not to. Regulators are terrified of stepping over their place behind an imaginary line that delineates the free market from a destructive market when all the while there is no line because there is only one market that possesses more or less of each characteristic, free and destructive, all the time. So it's safer for them to do nothing. So they largely do that. Nothing. Their fear is real. Careers hang in the balance based on the whims of the shakedown that is our politics.

Part of what the occupiers find so egregious, however, are the outsized incomes wielded by folks they see as essentially creating the very problems that has led to this country's jobless rate and indebtedness. And they form a convincing argument that a system only fails because of it's builders' failures. A system requires people to run it too. Many see a system that enriches the people working within it the most, who seem to take little time to reflect on whether doing so works to disenfranchise or even impoverish those outside it. We all agree a salesman needs a buyer. Demand desires a supply. We agree on the system - that capitalism works. But we also agree that the system works best, and most ethically, when opportunities to enter the playing field are even and terms are transparent to all parties involved. The occupiers that are reasonable and honest aren't protesting the tenets of the capitalist system, they're protesting over the lack of adherence to the tenets of the capitalist system, professed as free and fair by its leaders, who seem to change those rules whenever it bests suits the whims of the most expensive suits. In other words, the occupiers are having a buyers revolt. They're protesting the sellers' ways of playing the game that we all agree we want to play. But only when the rules of the game provide a fair shake to each team on the field.

But we digress.



What responsibility entails: reflection. What reflection begets: Sense?

Glass-Steagall shatterer, former Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill, says: ‘Split up’ the big banks, which amounts to a call to glue together the regulatory vase he himself (and others) crushed some 13 years ago. Flowers promised but yet received.

Easy for him to say, perhaps. Harder for those who could do it, to do it; certainly. Not impossible, though, not likely, either. But:

Some other VIPs agree with the ol' Bensonhurst-to-Greenwich, Conn., feller.



Monday, November 28, 2011

A Primer for Wall Street Occupiers and Residents Alike

Yearend deadlines have us waylaid in posting a long-awaited Street Controls update; expect text to fill the above-titled post by Dec. 21.


Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Wall Street Executes Milestone or Perfect PR Stunt?


Downright love fest! The announcement last month that big Wall Street bank supported bond platform Tradeweb had, according to itself, executed the first electronically traded credit default swap ("CDS") in the U.S., EVER, had all the markings of the perfect Wall Street PR stunt.

Take the highest volume producing, big-bank-to-big-customer bond trading platform - that's Tradeweb - and have it electronically execute a couple CDSs (presumably two) for New York-based hedge fund BlueMountain Capital Management, formerly the most outspoken fund on the planet regarding CDS market oddities via its former COO Samuel Cole, who pointed out in a letter to regulators in 2009 what he deemed the unfair "oligopoly" that the world's largest several banks effectively hold in the $32.7 trillion CDS market. Put all that together and whammo!... you've got PR crunk juice immaculate baby, from heaven!

Well, Cole left BlueMountain in August last year. And the biggest CDS clearer remains the bank-created ICE, with which the banks have huge profit-sharing arrangements, and thus prefer to do business (and by threatening not to, it has been argued, maintain sub rosa control over the market). And the CME's fledgling CDS clearing operation, which Cole was vying to strengthen at the time, remains with its little flightless feathers whisking up nary a fleck of CDS clearing business nearly two years later, despite getting a smidge of one on the books in early February, with the kindly help of Deutsche Bank (the executing bank), et al. If this all sounds a bit familiar, it is: you can find similar announcements regarding interest rate swap tent shows here, here and here. (And LCH.Clearnet dominates interest rate swap clearing via SwapClear by nearly 100 percent on trades between the big banks which majority-own the London-based clearer. While U.S.-centric contenders CME Group and Nasdaq could benefit if the big banks shift their allegiance in centrally clearing interest rate swap trades with buy-side asset managers, that would only happen easily if the big banks somehow gain majority shares in CME or Nasdaq: The banks like what they can control, and share ownership trumps exchange "membership" every time, at least in the string-pulling arena. The banks could of course always roll their own, like they've done ad infinitum over the years in the over-the-counter (off-exchange) bond trading sectors, like some proprietary trading firms did most recently with the Eris Exchange, the new Chicago prop trading firm-backed exchange for trading swap futures. Look anyway for the majority of the big banks' support (read: trading volume), per usual, to go to only one venue, based on instrument and customer type, as venue dominance of trading and clearing nearly all bonds and their derivatives is neatly divided according to product and counterparty.)

So the cynic in us says the message we're meant to take from the grand Feb. 10 announcement made by Tradeweb, but almost certainly emanating from the big, CDS swingin' banks?

Look! We traded and cleared CDS, AND with that dastardly, outspoken hedge fund that was so against us, AND we cleared with two clearers, which shows competition, right?... right?... RIGHT?! (This, despite Ice's continuing overwhelming dominance, but never you mind.) Let's stay on message: So... Everything's cool in CDS land. So,... fughetaboutit! Go home and... fughetaboutit! Right as rain here. Everything is. Just... Fughetaboutit! It's done. We've done it. Quiet down, just quiet down and... fughetaboutit,... let the injection take hold, there... now... sleep... just... sleeeep... ahhhh....

Done!



P.S. Food for thought: Why didn't the banks choose MarketAxess, the big-bank-to-big-client corporate bond-focused trading platform, to trade what is the natural speculative counterpart or hedge, or heck, speculative hedge -- meaning CDS -- to coincide with the trading of corporate bonds over MarketAxess? Not enough big CDS bank equity in ol' MKTX? Are the banks finally crowning just one bond platform king?

Addendum: Banks DID remember MKTX, precisely one month later: J.P. Morgan and, you guessed it, BlueMountain, as well as some others, hopped on board corporate bond platform MarketAxess for an e-CDS ring-a-ding, which you can read about here.

Thursday, February 3, 2011

Sinon VII: SEC Grants Street's Wish For Single-Dealer Swap Quotes and Admits There is No Real Trading Requirement

Well, we were right. The banks look to win in their efforts to maintain the status quo of big bank control over derivatives trading under new swaps rules the SEC proposed yesterday. Those rules would preserve single-dealer quotes as being allowed in trading on so-called Swap Execution Facilities, or "SEFs." Not that any such trading need occur, as it's not required by Dodd-Frank. As we've said again and again, the swaps "trading requirement" the mainstream press keeps referring to is no trading requirement at all. Trading would occur if and only if any such SEF facilities decide to make any swaps available for trading. Here's the SEC stating it plainly (well, "plainly" as in, only as a regulator is perhaps capable) yesterday:

"To ensure greater transparency in the security-based swaps market and reduce systemic risk, the Dodd-Frank Act sought to move the trading of security-based swaps onto regulated trading markets.

As such, Dodd-Frank requires security-based swap transactions that are required to be cleared through a clearing agency to be executed on an exchange or on a new trading system called a security-based swap execution facility. The Dodd-Frank Act, however, states that the transaction need not be executed on a security-based SEF or exchange if no security-based SEF or exchange makes the security-based swap "available to trade.""

A better way to say this of course would have been: A cleared swap is only required to be traded over an exchange or SEF if such an exchange or SEF makes it available for trading; there is no trading requirement unless the aforementioned occurs." But that would presume the absence of industry-regulator lawyering and its resulting crazy talk. Don't be fooled though; the resulting language was selected very carefully, fought and picked over, and was very purposeful and is aimed at giving political cover to both the industry and its politician overseers, as it relies on the fact that very few citizens, journalists included, read entire passages of voluminous and jargon-thick legislation. Stating first a requirement, and later stating an exception that completely weakens, and in this case, obliterates, the requirement, is a time-honored strategy of regulating industry, as it allows for the appearance of vigorous oversight, while letting the industry involved get its way. It's hoodwinked most of the press, that's for sure.

The Times and the Journal showed yesterday they continue to wrongly believe swaps "must" be, or are "required" to be, traded over an exchange or SEF. Bloomberg reporters in their coverage yesterday weirdly focused on what they confusingly described as the "small" number of firms participating in the swaps markets involved, when that amount is likely to be in the hundreds, if not thousands, as it includes
banks, hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds, etc., across the globe. Of course, accurate records are tough to come by in this labyrinthine marketplace. (And note that if none of these platforms make swaps available for trading - and if the several big banks that control these markets don't want them to, they won't - few swaps customer counterparties will show up for obvious reasons.)

Also, what one Reuters reporter just as confusingly referred to yesterday as "a narrow slice" of the derivatives market: the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) reminds us is a $32.7 trillion market,
in the form of credit default swaps, and another of those little bits, equity swaps, is a $6.6 trillion sector, in aggregate. We can presume our Reuters reporter meant "narrow slice" in relative terms, but with the gargantuan albeit aggregate (some trades cancel other trades out) numbers involved, this was at the very least a poor choice of words in describing the size of the market, as it could lead one to believe said market is small. Alas, there's no way of telling given the lack of numbers in the story.

Anyway, all the deep and relevant contextual background can be found in our old post here.


Tuesday, October 5, 2010

Shills Shovel Shit to Protect Hobbyhorses in "Flash Crash" Circus


This is a modified and much expanded upon excerpt from our preceding post that addressed the Flash Crash, though only in passing, but which, dear readers, we kindly suggest you read as well. But until then:

Pissing Not Raining:

Note that some market-making banks and brokers and high-speed traders, acting to protect their interests against
what seemed very odd trading activity in our American stock markets, took liquidity away - stopped or slowed buying and selling and/or accepting bids and offers (prices) on stocks - from said markets during the so-called "Flash Crash" of May 6, 2010, when a big sell-off of derivatives contracts linked to blue chip stocks contributed to the biggest - and certainly the quickest - one-day point decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average's history.

Everyone in this debacle is blaming everyone else for the problem. Fact is, the banks and traders lobbied the regulators for years to basically get the system we've got, which is extremely fractured - there is no fair access or single, level playing field - and is so obviously less than close to failsafe or sufficiently backstopped (no system is, but with nearly everyone's nest egg at stake, this one ought be a bit more reliable, and/or less easily gamed, no?). Again, as always, it takes leadership and good old-fashioned courage to admit the problem, which neither the regulators, the industry nor its analysts have shown they possess any whit of yet in this dissolution. Instead, finger-pointing and it's resulting cousin - confusion - reins.

But it becomes immediately clear to anyone that steps back for a moment to take a reasoned look at the facts of the situation, that rules that the industry asked to install, quash or ultimately shape, and the regulators either enacted, snuffed or modified according to the aforementioned desires, have got us the market that we have and they asked for: The rules have also worked to solidify brokers as advantaged gatekeepers in trading equities and their derivatives, and have empowered algorithmic, automated and high-speed traders. So the arch defensiveness of these brokers and traders is understandable, if not admirable: They've a long and hard road to hoe to prove the resulting positions of privilege are worth protecting. In the meantime, they might do themselves and everyone else a favor by admitting they are one class of ax wielders creating the potholes in our pockmarked road toward what could otherwise be a sufficiently smoother transit to a workable - and fairer - trading system, versus blaming wholesale the regulators for whom such criticism that our markets are biased and nearly uncontrollable should actually be shared: You get what you ask for, (and they did and have); 'least with this gang you do (so close to always it's a mere follicle shy of consistent.)

Players make money on the fucked-up-ness of markets. And so much loot is harder to make on a smooth-running one with fair and equal access. That's why a fair and equal market does not exist.

The trigger of the Flash Crash, turns out, according to seemingly everyone, was human error; that of a Kansas mutual fund trader at, it's been reported, Waddell & Reed, who put on an algorithmic (automated) futures trade that focused solely on volume but did not (by design) take time and price into account, so its selling steamrolled amid its own and other volume, which spooked other actors who also began to sell but eventually also pull back from the market due to this odd dip. It's a reaction comparable to people freezing to watch a car crash as it happens, standing by bewildered as a stranger makes a sudden run at jumping off a bridge, or an awed parent hugging her children as a meteor streaks overhead; certain of our brains need a moment to comprehend the sheer oddity of an anomalous situation. (A future is an agreement to buy or sell an equity or similar securities contract on a specified future date based on a price [and quantity and quality] that's agreed on today or in the present.)

However, this interpretation of May 6 events is hotly disputed by skeptics, who say the blame lies more with brokers and high-speed traders. But to cut through the mist, here's what we can say for certain:

This futures trade trigger ("cause" is an imprecise moreover inappropriate descriptor), if it truly was, isn't the real problem anyway - nor is some trader in Kansas. The market's biased, fractured structure, is. And playing the larger role in powering the swift tumult in question was everyones' (and their systems') reactions to the market's dynamics that day, as well as to this trade, which was technically executed NOT by Waddell & Reed but by a yet-to-be-named executing broker (only brokers have direct access to most execution venues like exchanges; mutual funds do not) although the algorithm, according to reports, was supplied by Barclays.

Brokers were found by the Securities and Exchange Commission, for instance, to have stopped filling retail (yours and mine) orders with their own "internal" inventory, and instead are reported to have routed a large portion of these trades into the public market as the market was falling. If your response is to say: Wow. Thanks. For nothing. Mean brokers. Remember that high-frequency traders, also, pick off your shit, all day long. You're buy and hold (or sell and fret); they're not.

The problem the Flash Crash shows is the odd, frail, decentralized, partisan, hierarchical, often unknowable nature of a market structure that The Street built. But sadly, asking certain of this bunch, particularly the loudmouths, to be the least bit introspective, is like trying to reason with a carpet viper.

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

GearGrind: What Long Island hedge fund purchased an IBM Blue Gene supercomputer and is using it to build a trading system?



In an interview we did back in May, a very well-connected, extraordinarily math fluent person dropped this beguiling gem:

A "Long Island-based hedge fund" had purchased an IBM Blue Gene supercomputer, and was using it to build a trading system. Cool!

Unfortunately, our attempts to find out exactly which "Long Island-based hedge fund" this is, have thus far failed. After much hand-wringing, we've decided to expose our incomplete reporting process on this one in order to perhaps crowd-source a winning confirmation, sorta like Seymour Hersh does when he gives speeches on tantalizing nuggets regarding U.S. foreign policy. Our reporting led us to focus on two potential funds that could, or could not be our Blue Gene owner, as ridiculous as that sounds, meaning we give you that, blog or not, that non-statement is near meaningless, lacking as it does, confirmation, denial or clarification in any way. But we're stuck.

Our best estimated guesses are: FQS Capital or Renaissance Technologies.

But again, let us emphasize that it's quite possible that neither of these funds owns a Blue Gene. Because neither will speak to us about the matter.

We know Renaissance Technologies, the well-known hedge fund based in East Setauket, N.Y., famous for its consistent, outsized returns - the first fit-the-bill fund that came to our mind - owns a Sun system, which is not necessarily a disqualification. A call that ended up being routed to an attorney for RenTec resulted in said attorney, audibly annoyed, grousing "Why are you calling me?" followed quickly by "No comment" and a scratchy click, which was him hanging up on me, after we asked him whether "RenTec" as they're sometimes known, had purchased a Blue Gene to help build a new, or improve an old, trading system.

Another source aware of the IBM Blue Gene's sale to a Long Island-based hedge fund said "all trails" lead to FQS Capital, the fund of funds founded by RenTec alum and math genius Robert J. Frey, located on the North Shore a little over two miles east down the scenic 25A, in Port Jefferson, N.Y. But this source could in no way offer any information that would confirm said trails' end is FQS; Frey stopped returning our calls and emails, including two inquiring directly about FQS and Blue Gene, so: Heck if we know. We simply have no more time to chase this one, so feel free to crowd-source a clincher.

While FQS is "headquartered" in the Cayman Islands, like most hedge funds, and its operational hub is in London, according to the firm's Web site, its founder's home is nearby the fund's Port Jefferson office. Both the Freys and RenTec founder James Simons and his wife are well-respected area philanthropists who have donated millions to local institutions; an example in the Frey's case is Mather Hospital; in the Simons' it's Stony Brook University, which, you guessed it, owns a Blue Gene supercomputer housed at Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, N.Y. Simons is the former chair of Stony Brook's math department; Frey is the director of Stony Brook's quantitative finance program and he still teaches there. Simons led a group of Renaissance partners and lab directors that gave $13 million to Brookhaven to save the lab's Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider from becoming a victim of a 2006 budget shortfall.

Note it's possible that, instead of owning a Blue Gene, FQS or Renaissance and Stony Brook could have deals which allow FQS or Renaissance to rent cycles on Stony Brook's "New York Blue" supercomputer - it's a growing trend for universities to structure similar arrangements; the schools view such deals as alternative methods for monetizing their resources, thereby increasing funding. Or - again that dreaded bugger of the unconfirmed - perhaps neither [or either] fund does this with Stony Brook's "Blue."

(An aside: It's important to add that such University-supercomputer rental arrangements pose ethical dilemmas for schools, including promoting money-making to maths and physics students who might otherwise be focused on solving what can be argued are the bigger or more worthwhile problems of humanity, such as eradicating cancer or building a workable energy infrastructure. Schools can also be easily criticized for allowing their big machines to be used for what some would deem rather basal purposes of bashing the big capital markets pinata until the sweet lucre falls out. Yet the universities counter that some of these agreements include intellectual property sharing that occurs between the schools and the private sector firms, which need not be and are not always financial companies; and that any private sector funds resulting from supercomputer rental can help pay for other math or scientific research aimed at achieving benefits that go more society-wide than say, a get-richer-quicker scheme.)

Know this: There are very few high-profile funds out on "the island" with enough lucre to buy a Blue Gene, which costs $1.5 million per rack or so, per server in the system cluster, making this certainly a multi-million dollar affair that could easily creep toward the $10 million neighborhood - after all: who could buy just one? So it's a fairly reasoned process of elimination, ultimately hampered by it's resolute lack of irrefutable proof, to narrow the field to these two high-profile, well-backed funds (although RenTec has exponentially more cash than FQS, that's also meaningless, as spending a few million to grow FQS' pot of $350 million in assets under management seems a ratio that's plausible). So:

Fuckles. We just dah-burned don't know.

But if we knew how old this jpg-based (smart!) road (or home) show courtesy of Zero Hedge was, we might,...might be able to eliminate RenTec as the Blue Gene owner, as it posits RenTec as a Sun shop. I say only "might" because maybe RenTec wanted to replace this Sun system, or perhaps more likely (as supercomputer replacement seems complicated, does it not?) the idea was to buy another newer system and run two (at least) supercomputers for other, or some mix, of funds or strategies? It's usually a mixed bag for big firms, although perhaps the 'once a Sun shop, always a Sun shop' reasoning applies here, if RenTec's nearly unparalleled performance is in any way attributed to its SunFire hardware?

FQS could just as likely be our huckleberry. Heck, maybe it's Billy Joel, trying to crack the top ten again by massively parallelizing a new hit through some hedge fund front company (that would be pretty cool, actually). But who knows?

Blue Gene could perhaps be the technology that a firm like FQS, a fund of funds, applies to optimize intelligence on performance (or some other metric) of the hedge or other funds in which it invests or is considering investing, in order to garner “actionable” data to both allocate, and do trading, sort of speak. (A fund of funds is simply a hedge fund that invests in other investment vehicles, such as other hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, or a hedge fund that is a portfolio of other such funds or investments.)

We've read with fascination Frey's explanation in the Financial Times and elsewhere of FQS' “more quantitative approach to strategy allocation,” which to us implies needing in-depth data on a lot, if not most, or all, of the hedge-type funds out there, to truly make “multi-strategy” worth its name. Maybe I’m wrong, and we loathe speculation, but we've been forced into it. We really wanted to discuss the aforementioned with this fella, and whether high-performance computing is playing more of a role in fund of funds strategies – the latter something that may not be immediately obvious, but that which conceivably could provide novel ways of garnering attractive returns on fund of funds - or "FoF" investment.

Alas, no one we reached out to is talking definitively on these matters.

Background: Why supercomputers? Hedge funds and other financial firms generally use supercomputers to scour data in milliseconds for real-time trading, and/or to analyze massive reams of historical data, in the latter case, to come up with strategies that they hope will make them money when they apply them to trading later, or in the future. Critics claim such supercomputers enable firms using them an unfair advantage over the average investor, who can't afford or even get access to such powerful number crunching and lightning fast capabilities. Some firms deploy them in strategies based on rapidly trading in and out of stocks to make money on small up- or down-ticks in the equities, which can be in decimals or sub-penny ranges.

Opponents say using supercomputers to conduct such high-speed trading essentially equates with allowing one set of privileged, wealthy investors to peck away at what essentially is the larger public's nest egg, or rapidly hitting a piñata of money funded in no small part by average investors who are barred by regulators from such hitting-the-piñata-trading, with sticks that move faster than the eye or brain can perceive, sticks which are reserved for wielding by the privileged few. Because who in your neighborhood can buy a massively parallel supercomputer (the stick)? Depends on the neighborhood I guess. But remember, these critics have emphasized, you're the bag getting hit by the sticks; it's your money falling out the holes.

Supporters argue that such firms and systems supply the market with more liquidity, meaning they buttress the overall system by creating more trading, and hence increase the market's overall depth and size than would be possible in their absence. No conclusive proof has emanated from the debate about whether hedge funds promote economic growth through such trading. As to whether their alternative viewpoints are enough to lead to more accurate and efficient markets: The "efficient markets" hypothesis was proven deeply flawed in real world testing by the mortgage disaster: There were too few firms taking alternative, meaning negative, views on the overblown mortgage market, resulting in a Great Recession that nearly cratered Wall Street and the economy with it. But those too few firms? Those contrarians made a shitload of money. And inefficiencies, fair or not, equal "alpha" in this game. That's Street talk for big fat piles of lucre.

(We dare anyone to prove the efficient markets hypothesis works, under any plausible, real world market structure that policymakers could conceivably spit out under industry-regulatory political realities as anything more than a delusive talking point for certain wealth management strategists to employ, aimed at tricking others and themselves into rationalizing their existence as beneficial to the whole or most, rather than the few. Beware of too elegant explanations, although they're not always wrong. We're certain no one with any knowledge ever said and believed it that the market's egalitarian.)

Note that some market-making banks and brokers and high-speed traders, acting to protect their interests against what seemed very odd trading activity, took liquidity away - stopped or slowed buying and selling and/or accepting bids and offers (prices) on stocks - from the market during the so-called "Flash Crash" of May 6, 2010, when a big sell-off of derivatives contracts linked to blue chip stocks contributed to the biggest one-day point decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average's history. Everyone in this debacle is blaming everyone else for the problem. Fact is, the banks and traders lobbied the regulators for years to basically get the system we've got, which is extremely fractured - there is no fair access or single, level playing field - and is so obviously less than close to failsafe or sufficiently backstopped. Again, as always, it takes leadership to admit the problem, which neither the regulators, the industry nor its analysts have shown they possess one iota of yet in this debacle. Instead, finger-pointing and it's resulting cousin - confusion - reins. But it becomes immediately clear to anyone that steps back for a moment to take a reasoned look at facts of the situation, that rules that the industry asked for and the regulators either enacted or snuffed, have worked to solidify brokers as advantaged gatekeepers in trading equities and their derivatives, and have empowered high-speed traders. So the arch defensiveness of these brokers and traders is understandable, if not admirable: They have a hard road to hoe to prove their privileged positions are worth protecting. In the meantime, they might do themselves and everyone else a favor by admitting they are one class of ax wielders creating the potholes in our pockmarked road toward what could be a sufficiently workable - and fairer - trading system, versus blaming wholesale the regulators for whom such criticism should actually be shared: You get what you ask for, (and they did); 'least with this gang you do.

Is any of this "fair?"

One bit of proof - although its accuracy is ample and uncontested - that our tagline paraphrased as 'the market is not free nor fair, the vig is steep and you're an outgunned mark for bigger monied profit-takers' is true? The law.

Allegedly to protect the public from fraud, the SEC enforces rules that say that investors with less than $1 million in net worth (and this metric cannot include any owned residences), or those making less than $200,000 per year (or $300,000 jointly) over the last two consecutive years, are by law prohibited from access to professional money management aimed at garnering big returns. One also needs $5 million or more in 'investable' assets to join a fund that has more than 100 investors. The government essentially is saying that if you don't have a lot of money, you need protecting, from potentially making a lot of money. Put another way: You're not smart enough to understand the risks inherent in "complicated" hedge funds, private equity and venture capital investing, nor the risks undertaken by these funds' managers. So you get no chance to chase their whiz-kid strategies and hence, at least in some cases, their outsized returns: Simons' flagship fund, for instance, has returned nearly 45 percent annually in net returns since its inception in 1988.

This is problematic, because it's patently unfair. It can work to create, or some would say, solidify, an uber-aristocracy, because it engenders a situation where the rich are given an avenue to get richer from which average persons are barred, in the same system average persons help fund or pay for. This sounds like a critique on capitalism. This is NOT a critique on capitalism: We like and support capitalism. And we think that if you're smart and able, you ought to have the freedom to go out there and be successful, and if that means making money in the markets: go for it. This is just a critique on how our capital markets are run. This is a critique on the claim that the markets involved are free, or as fair as they should be, and by that, we mean that it's our wager that if our market system were put on trial in the civil courts, a jury of reasonable citizens would with a reasonable degree of certainty declare the market insufficiently fair by a reasonable degree. We point you to blogger and software consultant Jeffry R. Fisher's definition of "fair market capitalism" using the analogy of a race versus a fight. In a race, everyone moves forward albeit in varying levels of achievement in how quickly they cross the finish line. Lanes are clearly marked so it's obvious when they're crossed. And proceed from the construct there are NO performance-enhancing drugs involved. Each has a fair chance of winning, the finish can often be close and few will ever completely fail, meaning stop short of the finish line. In a fight, one person's achievement is the other's downfall. So typically, whoever's got the biggest guns, wins. The market right now resembles the fight, in which only the wealthy get the space-age firepower with which to go into battle at the expense of the less armed. (We have no idea if Fisher's analogy is original but it's a good one regardless and kudos to promoting it.) Further, this is a critique that the "free, open and fair" odious miasma that some regulators and industry mouthpieces seem always to so unctuously spit and plague us with is bullshit.

To better understand this, please read below a set of provocative questions we posed to the SEC in 2006 when it was proposing to increase the level of minimum assets required to participate in hedge fund investing to $2.5 million. The SEC might have helped itself if it were to have proposed instead to somehow segregate or wall off investments of average investors from wealthy hedge fund strategies that can and have harmed the average investor, though short of banning certain strategies, we've no idea how that could be done. Yet that is the same idea behind the major investment firms - including hedge funds - demands that the big Wall Street banks segregate or protect their assets in separate accounts walled off from the banks' everyday activities to protect these firms' assets from potentially being mired in any folly in which those daily activities could snare the particular bank involved. Such demands have risen after firms found some of their investment or "margin" trading accounts frozen at Lehman Brothers when it went bankrupt Sept. 15, 2008; some are still locked up, including in Lehman's London offices. Anyway, the SEC proposal to raise the minimum net worth required to invest in hedge funds went nowhere, but it made clearer to us that the market structure increasingly threatens to further institutionalize what seems to critics a caste system pitting the have-more-than-we-know-what-to-do-withs, against the have-barely-enoughs.

From my 2006 email:

1.) Why is it that the SEC’s solution for mitigating the risks posed by hedge funds is to bar those that are less-well-off from being able to participate and potentially benefit from the outsized returns and gains that hedge funds can enable? The SEC’s idea is to wall off these lucrative investment vehicles only to those who already have big wallets and/or assets. But by making for certain that it is only wealthy people that are allowed to seek outsize returns by engaging in hedge fund risk, how is the SEC really bolstering a truly fair and free market?

2.) Doesn’t this effectively wall off a huge source of liquidity for hedge funds to pick off and over -- namely a huge pool of average investor money unable to engage in employing various strategies and thus a sitting duck for same – as hedge funds by their nature employ techniques such as market timing, shorting and shareholder activism, which effectively works to transfer to the rich large buckets of money from the pool of money invested by the average investor who, if the SEC would have it, would be barred from accessing these aggressive techniques and thus be a potential victim to their strategies and on the wrong side of the trade, or whatever tradeoff is involved?

3.) In other words, market timing is a great example: this is wealthy money employing a trading strategy that benefited wealthy investors and their hedge fund managers at the expense of the less-well-off, average investor. Shouldn’t the SEC be seeking better ways of ensuring hedge funds aren’t enriching themselves exponentially based on strategies in which saying it plain would mean saying they’re [siphoning] hard-earned invested dollars from the poor or less fortunate, instead of pursuing a “protective” measure that effectively weakens the investment choice of these less fortunate?

Thanks, appreciate your quick response."

We never received an email back, and although the SEC spokesperson we deal with generally will call us, versus email, it's to the best of our recollection that no such call was ever received. The "market timing" we cited refers to a 2003 scandal involving certain mutual funds allowing select hedge fund clients to trade rapidly in and out of the funds, a practice these funds publicly said they prohibited and regardless was a trading strategy unavailable to general fund holders. This type of market timing can bring incremental profits for those employing the strategy, but can also come at the expense - in millions of dollars of losses - to general fund investors. What you don't know can hurt you. It did here. It will always.



Thursday, September 16, 2010

Dis Pater: Quarter-end Window Dressing by Banks Open Secret for Years


FYI: Lehman Brothers' "repo 105" transactions being investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and similar techniques allegedly bent toward achieving similar goals - those of understating at quarter-end the level of debt these banks typically carry for the purposes of boosting in the eyes of the market their companies' values, has long been an open secret...

We wrote about it in 2003: